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1. Introduction
Carl Schmitt conceptualized “the political” on the basis of an 
existential distinction of friend and enemy. His famous thesis that 
all significant modern political concepts are secularized theological 
concepts, along with the friend-enemy distinction as a necessary 
prerequisite for the possibility of politics, provides a particular 
theoretical device for an analysis of the structure of political power, 
having been controversial as it is. Having said that, this paper is 
an attempt to look at Husserl through the lens of Schmitt, with a 
belief that the Schmittian thinking of the political offers an 
effective means to look at Husserl’s phenomenology from a 
different angle. 
To say the conclusion first, we find a peculiarly Schmittian 
character of the political in and through the metaphysical logic of 
Husserlian phenomenological critique and subjectivity. The attempt 
to connect politics directly to the theoretical structure of 
phenomenology as such, especially to Husserl’s, in distinction from 
a general ideological critique, may look odd to many, for Husserl’s 
phenomenology most loudly and most resolutely speaks up for the 
concept of the “transcendental-ideal” as opposed to that of the 
“factual-real” to which belongs the concept of the political itself as 
well as the world of politics. Overall, Husserl’s phenomenology 
claims itself to be the highest form of metaphysics that concerns 
fundamentally the most traditional themes of philosophy such as 
truth and being. 
Now we discover the political of a peculiar kind precisely 
through the manner in which the metaphysical truth and being is 
phenomenologically treated in Husserl and find a possibility that it 
can be clarified with the political of Schmittian kind. In other 
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words, the transcendental subject that plays an essential role in 
Husserl’s phenomenological critique of reason reveals itself as a 
being which obtains the critical thrust from the logic of the 
political of Schmittian kind. 
In this work, we will attempt to show how and to what extent 
the structural character of Husserlian phenomenological subject 
conforms to the conceptual structure of the Schmittian kind of the 
political and thereupon will argue that Schmittian politico-theological 
aspect is a significant moment of the metaphysical essence of 
Husserlian subjectivity and critique. In fact, the politicality that 
characterizes the theoretical structure and mechanism of Husserl’s 
phenomenology in toto has a wider and deeper semantic and 
thematic spectrum; hence, to demonstrate it will have to be a much 
larger project which exceeds the limit of this paper. For that 
reason, this work rather aims to brighten a Schmittian moment with 
the political present specifically in the conceptual structure of 
Husserlian subjectivity and critique, and thereby to suggest that 
Schmitt, as a methodological tool, is a possibility with which 
Husserlian notion of transcendental purity and absolute grounding 
can be analyzed and interpreted on the coordinate of the political.
For that purpose, we will focus in particular on Husserl’s text, The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology1) and 
the writings appended to it as the main material, where the 
phenomenological theory of subjectivity and critique takes the most 
comprehensive shape, while also frequently turning to Husserl’s 
1) Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970 [Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die 
Transzendentale Phänomenologie, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962]—Crisis 
hereafter.
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other works whenever the need is called upon. The selected lens 
will be two of Schmitt’s most notable texts: The Concept of the 
Political2) and Political Theology3)
2. Schmittian Logic of the Political
1) The Friend-Enemy Antinomy as a Structural Essence 
of the Political 
In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt proposes a famous thesis 
that an existential distinction between friend and enemy is an 
absolute condition for the possibility of the work of the political. 
With this thesis, Schmitt repeatedly alerts readers not to be 
confused about the concept of enemy with the one in a moral 
distinction. This distinction is exclusively existential, “not as 
metaphors or symbols, not mixed and weakened by economic, 
moral and other conceptions.”4) Enemy is not an object of mere 
hatred or emotional hostility; it is neither an economic competitor 
nor a polemical opponent, and so forth. Rather the distinction is 
completely independent not influenced by any other antithesis such 
as a moral distinction between good and evil or an aesthetic 
distinction between the beautiful and the ugly. It is perfectly 
possible that the enemy is not morally evil or aesthetically ugly or 
economically disadvantageous. But he is still an enemy precisely in 
the sense, to the extent that “he is the other, the stranger”; “it is 
sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, 
2) Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
3) Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985.
4) Schmitt (1996), 27-28.
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existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme 
case conflicts with him are possible.”5) 
The otherness as such, as that which is existentially irreconcilable 
with my own manner of being is the criterion to decide who the 
enemy is. The enemy precisely in that otherness is a political 
enemy. The whole reason that it is a political enemy is that it 
exists as a threat. The threat as such doesn’t even have to be 
actual yet; only qua possibility to be a threat, the being of a 
political enemy is actual already; the enemy becomes concrete in 
that possibility to be a threat. The presence of the other whose 
manner of being cannot be assimilated into mine is a threat to a 
legitimate raison d’être of myself; just the fact that they are 
present qua oddity, qua stranger, impossible to be integrated to my 
system, threatens me; with their presence only, I feel threatened. 
Therefore, the enemy must be completely eradicated. All of this 
now consists of the logical content of jus belli. No other 
justification of war can exist than a political justification; there is 
no rational, moral, juridic legitimacy of war but a political 
legitimacy grounded upon an “existential threat to one’s own way 
of life.”6)
A state is a decisive political entity whose legitimacy stands 
precisely on jus belli. The state power can be manifest and 
justified only on the “capacity or will” to make the distinction of 
friend and enemy, which corresponds precisely to the will and 
capacity of Sovereign to decide “who the enemy is” absolutely 
beforehand; without the capacity or the will to make that 
distinction, the state “ceases to exist politically,” which leads to an 
annihilation of sovereign power.7) On this rule, the “protection- 
5) Schmitt (1996), 27.
6) Schmitt (1996), 49.
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obedience” deal between the sovereign and subjects is not 
determined by a defensive power a posteriori, but made a priori in 
a preemptive power, i.e., in the readiness to attack and die upon 
the threat.8) That is the political rationality of war: the only 
rationality for jus belli. In order to maintain the political power, 
Sovereign ought never to cease to live by such antinomy which 
proves the sovereign power to be absolute. 
We owe the meaning of “antinomy” here to Kant’s own. The 
friend-enemy antagonism in Schmitt is not an expression of 
irrationality or absurdity which should and could be logically 
removed upon a series of compromising acts or contracts. To the 
contrary, the conflict itself is the essence of the rationality of the 
political; it is not to be solved, insofar as the political logos 
emerges and operates all and only on the presence of an enemy 
qua an object to be eliminated in principle. The necessity to keep 
the enemy and that to eliminate it are both equally rational 
demands. It is precisely in this sense that the friend-enemy 
distinction is an antinomy, i.e., a rational conflict as opposed to an 
irrational contradiction.9)
7) Schmitt (1996), 49.
8) Schmitt (1996) .48-53.
9) Such Schmittian political antinomy is found in Rancière’s 
conceptualization of the meaning of politics. According to Rancière, 
politics arises at the moment that a part feels “discordance” about the lots 
that it thinks legitimately deserves due to its contribution to the good of 
the whole. Politics is impossible without a consciousness of the “wrong” 
and this wrong is not a simple injustice that is going to be logically 
resolved by an equal allotment of a due portion to each part. To the 
contrary, ever present disagreement over the justifiability of the counted is 
a condition for the possibility of politics. This Rancièrian interest of 
political logos in designating a due ontological place meets with the 
interest of Husserlian phenomenological logos, as we shall see below. See 
Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie 
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According to the Schmittian logic, all religious wars are to be 
fundamentally political wars, insofar as the being of a religion is 
existentially intimidated by the presence of the other who exist and 
live outside its belief system, not accepting its imperatives, by the 
very way that they are in that otherness. To be precise, however, 
that cannot be a general nature of any religion but a systemic 
essence of the religion having the slogan of a universal religion, 
such as Christianity. As a matter of fact, the Schmittian logic of the 
condition for the possibility of the political quite accurately grasps 
the structure of Christian jus bell, insofar as the legitimacy of 
Christian telos, namely, the universal kingdom of God is necessarily 
fed by the believer-nonbeliever distinction as an “inherent reality 
and a real possibility,”10) upon which the nonbeliever must be 
eliminated according to the Creator’s rule of judgment. Particularly 
the modern history of Christianization outside the West, usually 
accompanied and protected by the European military-economic 
imperialism in most cases, somewhat exemplifies the Schmittian 
point.11) Now through Political Theology, such Schmittian perception 
is established into a strict formula as an inherent structural 
co-relation between the theological and the political. 
Rose, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minneapolis Pr., 1999.
10) Schmitt (1996), 28
11) Quite impressively as a western intellectual, Schmitt offers an opportunity 
with which the history of the propagation of Christianity can be openly 
talked on the horizon of the political instead of the religious, for his 
conceptualization of the political brings out a point that the logic of 
Christianity is political precisely in its structural-existential essence.
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2) The Exclusive Right of the Political-Theological 
Sovereign to Decide on Exception
In Political Theology, Schmitt lays out another well-known thesis 
that “All significant concepts of modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts.”12) The thesis claims that from 
counter-revolutionary theists to revolutionary deists, including 
bourgeois liberalists, radical anarchists as well as Marxists, the 
theological concept of divine sovereignty as the sole ultimate source 
of the emanation of power is in play behind their reflections on 
the state power. It has been conventionally reformulated as the 
thesis of “secularization” that the modern western European political 
theories on sovereignty prevailing up until the nineteenth century 
are based on medieval theological concepts.13) A key idea of this 
thesis is that what determines the threshold of politics where the 
political and the unpolitical is decided is itself a political decision 
of the sovereign who anchors his political power in the 
“exceptional” power of God who makes a miracle possible; the 
power of God has been secularized into the power of Prince and 
the power of constitutional law in modern European states. 
What is of premier significance in Schmitt’s theorization of the 
political theological sovereignty is the notion of “decision.” 
Ausnahmezustand, though translated into “exception” in English, 
means a “state of emergency” in the first order, incorporating the 
meaning of “crisis” within its semantic range; an extra-ordinary 
state as exceptional to a normal state represents a crisis which 
requires an emergent decision, i.e., a decision to make a judgment 
that it is a state of emergency. Exception first denotes a counter- 
12) Schmitt (1985), 36.
13) See T. B. Strong’s Forward in Schmitt (1985), xxiv-xxix.
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normal state as such, but it also means exceptionality as a formal 
quality of the position and power of the sovereign who decides 
such phenomenal content as an exception. Similarly, decision 
implies a claim on the right to decide and simultaneously signifies 
what to decide. Only the sovereign placed in the position of the 
exceptional power already, who cannot be more than one, can 
decide exception as having such and such abnormal phenomenal 
content: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”14) 
Now, the exceptionality of sovereign power is represented by a 
complete “monopoly” of the right to decide. In a state of 
emergency, the normality of juridic normativity to manage order 
ceases to function; order is now given outside the rule of law, in 
the very exteriority of jurisdiction, on which the absolute normative 
juridic power is now exercised. Sovereignty is thus a complete 
concentration of normative power outside the territory of 
jurisdiction.
“The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He has 
the monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the 
state’s sovereignty which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the 
monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide.” (Schmitt 
1985, 13, added italics) 
The position of sovereign is an absolute sink hole sucking into 
itself all existing norms of ordering and eo ipso an absolute source 
of normativity as such from out of which legitimacy itself springs. 
Absolute power identifies itself in the making of a decision on the 
exception: “Exception proves everything.”15)
What is then the source of the monopoly right of decision? What 
14) Schmitt (1985), 5. Italics are added.
15) Schmitt (1985), 15.
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ultimately justifies it? Nothingness: “the decision emanates from 
nothingness.”16) There is no such thing as a priori primordial 
normativity, because the decision itself is made outside legal order, 
and thus “proves that to produce law it need not be based on 
law.”17) It is not that the legitimacy of decision is ascribed due to 
the fact that there is a norm prior; but “a point of ascription first 
determines what a norm is and what a normative rightness is.”18) 
What justifies the decision is not a priori normativity, but the other 
way around; upon the decision, normativity itself is instituted. 
Therefore, there is no intrinsically metaphysical nonpolitical cause 
for the determination and exercise of power, whether it is the 
power of knowledge, or the power of Prince or the power of God. 
The decision of “who the enemy is” as a manifestation of “who 
the sovereign is” is a political state of affairs simpliciter. There is 
nothing other than, prior to the political―once again, this is to be 
a clearest Schmittian message. 
Now one can find a definite structural parallelism among 
metaphysics, theology and modern constitutional state politics in 
Schmittian reflection.19) The analogy between the power of Prince 
and the power of God is eligible between the exception in 
jurisprudence and the miracle in theology. Throughout the 
Enlightenment, metaphysical universal rationalism has reified the 
theological concepts into jurisprudence as such, while rejecting any 
theological exceptionalism in principle. In turn, the universal power 
of law and the state run solely by legal order has become of the 
exceptional “legitimatizing authority” as such,20) on which the 
16) Schmitt (1985), 32.
17) Schmitt (1985), 13.
18) Schmitt (1985), 32.
19) Schmitt (1985), 36-52.
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omnipotent power of the first Creator is identified with the power 
of law-giver: the divine exceptional power that authorized the 
existence of the world and a miracle is imposed upon the power of 
jurisdiction as the sole foundation of every legitimacy. Now reason 
is the only common denominator that doubly binds divinity and 
legality, qua the exception as such that produces norm out of its 
own exceptionality as absolute normativity.
For Schmitt, the link among metaphysics, theology and politics is 
found, not in a simple mirroring of a monarch in the Cartesian 
concept of God as the first law-giver, but in a structural concordance 
between the legal-theological concepts and the metaphysical concepts 
with which certain political-historical epoch presents itself.21) 
“The metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has the 
same structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate 
as a form of its political organization. The determination of such an identity 
is the sociology of the concept of sovereignty. It proves that…metaphysics is 
the most intensive and the clearest expression of an epoch.”(Schmitt 1985, 46) 
This strikingly Foucauldian remark tells us that a tendency is 
discovered that an epoch justifies the political presentation of its 
being on the ground of a metaphysical necessity. The secularization 
of theological concepts corresponds as such to a metaphysical 
‘politicization’ of them, which is a peculiarly Western European 
phenomenon. On the other hand, the rationalizing force that 
metaphysics provides overlaps with the power of modern scientific 
positivity. The authority of metaphysical-scientific self-evidence that 
seemingly extricates the question of exceptional sovereignty and 
generalizes it with the concept of natural objectivity, is itself a 
20) Schmitt (1985), 48.
21) Schmitt (1985), 45-46.
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positivistic metamorphosis of the Sovereign of all creation; with 
science, sovereign is internalized into the logic of a system, 
precisely by deistically being put aside qua only an “architect” of 
the system, so that “the machine runs by itself.”22) Now the system 
itself is sovereign. In this way, sovereign is so alive, even with the 
modern scientific thinking.23) 
The theological tendency metaphysically politicized is not a 
characteristic merely specific to the epoch of absolute monarchy in 
the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, through which the idea 
of the theological transcendence was still socially intellectually 
accepted. Schmitt insists that the “political metaphysics”24)) 
grounded on the theological concept of sovereignty is as effective 
and valid a picture even for the following epoch of democracy in 
the nineteenth century, during which the conception of immanence 
completely took over that of transcendence throughout the entire 
culture. Now the absolute power of transcendent God is 
immanentized into the general will of the people or the universal 
power of law or of the teleologically reified scientific objectivity of 
the world. That is what happened from Tocqueville to Hegel in the 
epoch of immanence.25) 
Now we run across here an important Schmittian insight into the 
inherently political function of the idea of Causa Sui. When 
recapitulating legal-political concepts of sovereignty in fundamental 
relation to theological concepts, Schmitt interprets the power of 
exception into the power of giving legitimacy. Whether the 
exception refers to the traditionally transcendent theological God or 
22) Schmitt (1985), 48.
23) Schmitt (1985), 47-48.
24) Schmitt (1985), 49.
25) Schmitt (1985), 49-50.
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the monarch of an absolute state or the people in democratic 
collectivity or the normativity of reason or the systematicity of 
science, whatever shape it may be, it commonly represents an 
exceptional source point “from which everything emanates and to 
which everything returns,” namely, “the cause and the end of all 
things.”26) This is nothing but what Causa Sui means, an absolute 
being and formula, which contains the cause of its existence within 
itself, while itself being the cause of every other existence; it posits 
itself as the exceptional authority where all legitimatization begins 
and ends. Precisely with that conceptual-tautological potency, Causa 
Sui has taken up such essential place in the Western metaphysical 
theological tradition. Schmittian point of view depicts that such 
metaphysical self-positing of Causa Sui is nothing but a political 
decision already. Interestingly, as we will discuss from the below 
on, such Schmittian insight into the function of the political in the 
metaphysical conceptual structure of Causa Sui and self-evidence 
aids us deconstruct27) the structure of Husserlian phenomenological 
decision of the normative-ideal power of the transcendental subject 
as the absolute agency of philosophical critique, which counts 
precisely on the same kind of conceptual force.  
3. Husserlian Logic of Critique: 
Critique, Subjectivity and Philosophy
In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology known as Husserl’s last publication, along with 
26) Schmitt (1985), 49.
27) The meaning of the term ‘deconstruct’ here does not follow Derridian 
concept of “deconstruction.” It had better be taken literally in the sense of 
an analytic disassembling. 
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“The Vienna Lecture,”28) Husserl poses his incipient question again, 
what it is be a science in a genuine sense.29) He recaps his whole 
career there, reminding that the motif and goal of phenomenology 
is a metaphysical rejuvenation of reason with a serious reform of 
Kantian critique. Throughout Husserl, the problem of science has 
been addressed with the consciousness of the metaphysical chasm 
between de facto positive sciences and de jure eidetic sciences. The 
de jure science represents the idea of “genuine science(echter 
Wissenschaft)” as the science that justifies itself by pure principles 
and thereby works as a norm for actual sciences,30) which thereof 
has a purely self-sufficient ideal being as its object of thematization, 
while de facto positive sciences guided by the “natural 
attitude(natürliche Einstellung)” explain out everything as a real 
object in the limit of spatiotemporal causation.31) 
Throughout his later period, Husserl concentrates his phenomenological 
effort on a clarification of the meaning of this chasm as the problem 
28) E. Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity,” trans. 
David Carr, in Crisis, pp. 269-99 [“Die Krisis des Europäischen 
Menschentums und die Philosophie,” lecture presented before the Vienna 
Cultural Society in 1935]—“PCE” hereafter. 
29) This is precisely the question that launched Husserl’s first phenomenological 
project. E. Husserl, Logical Investigations vol. I, trans. J.N. Findlay, New 
York: Humanities Press, 1970.
30) See E. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns, 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, pp. 1-17.
31) Delimitation of positivity in the “natural attitude” is first given in Ideas I 
and is constantly repeated everywhere up to the Crisis. [See E. Husserl, 
Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, 
trans. F. Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983, §30] A more 
thorough discussion of that attitude in clear contrast to the “transcendental 
attitude” is done in “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,” 
trans. Ted E. Klein, Jr. & William E. Pohl, Southwestern Journal of 
Philosophy 5:3, Fall, 1974, pp. 9-56. 
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of transcendental genesis of science. What is at issue is how the 
historical-positive objectivity of science, geometry e.g., can be 
ultimately validated on the ground of the transcendental origin 
(Ursprung) that makes it possible for the scientific meaning to be 
produced in the first place, passing down through history, and 
constituted into a legitimate positivity.32) The problem of science is now 
to be the problem of how to clarify the origin of positivity as such, 
in which itself cannot be understood in positive-scientific, 
empirical-historical manner. Eventually, the metaphysical chasm above 
mentioned is elucidated into a genetic distance between the empirical 
subjectivity psycho-physicalistically determined and the transcendental 
subjectivity ontologically self-sufficient (selbstständig), and 
epistemologically self-justifiable. 
Husserl argues that this gulf has been “concealed(verborgen)” in 
all previous understandings of objectivity including Kant’s and calls 
the concealment of that distance the “enigma of subjectivity(Rätsel der 
Subjectivität)”33) as that which Kant’s critique was unable to handle; it 
indicates a paradox of Kantian subject who transcendentally constitutes 
empirical objectivity and yet is rendered to be an object in the end, 
which cannot but belong to the real world of experience. The basic 
Husserlian rationale for this criticism of Kant is that the justification 
of transcendentality should never depend on spatiotemporal and 
causal relations which condition real objectivity as opposed to ideal 
objectivity. This apriori nonaffectivity from the spatiotemporal-causal 
limitation, precisely as the ontological essence of an ideal being 
guarantees a successful operation of the transcendental mechanism of 
32) “The Origin of Geometry” deals with this issue of transcendental genesis 
with the single case of geometry. E. Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” 
trans. David Carr, in Crisis, pp. 353-378 —“OG” hereafter.
33) Husserl(1970a), 5.
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the justification of scientific knowing.34) 
To solve the enigma, the region for the transcendental subject 
must be absolutely spared precisely with respect to completely 
nonempirical, nonreal purity. That indicates nothing but a realm for 
the absolute origin. The absolute means clearly here pure 
ontological self-sufficiency and immanence. Absolute is all and only 
the essence of the ideal region as the “absolutely self-contained 
realm of purely subjective being.”35) Within this region, the being 
of the transcendental subject is completely “closed off” and 
self-given rather than being given in the mode of constitution, 
thereby intuitively self-comprehended as a pure lived experience.36) 
Then the enigma of Kantian subjectivity signals nothing but a 
failure in the settlement of the transcendental subject in the 
absolute region, qua a self-sufficient, self-given, and self-justifiable 
being.37)The problem of subjectivity turns out to be exactly the 
problem of the unidentified, concealed status of the pure subject 
whose transcendental power has to be fixed at the place of the 
absolute once and for all. As long as the ontological boundary for 
the place of the absolute is obscure, the transcendental mission of 
34) All phenomenological thoughts on the ultimate justification of science and 
reason are fundamentally based on the absolute distinction between the 
ideal and the real set out in the very first beginning; the whole discussion 
of Prolegomena in the Logical Investigations is dedicated to this matter. 
Since then, the spatiotemporality and causality as the essence of the real 
has been repeatedly identified into a primordial inability to validate the 
timeless truthfulness of ideal being. Husserl(1970b), 9-161.
35) Husserl(1974), 29.
36) Husserl(1983), §§49-50 & §55. About Husserl’s formulation of “regional 
ontology,” see Husserl(1983), §§9-10 and Ludwig Landgrebe, The 
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six Essays, Don Welton ed. Cornell: 
Ithca, 1981, chap.5: “Regions of Being and Regional Ontologies in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology.”
37) Husserl(1970a), §§ 29-32.
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the ultimate justification of science with no further questionability 
cannot be completed. Insofar as Kant leaves “unquestioned 
(unbefragt)” the essential necessity and possibility of the absolute 
distinction between the two regions of being, namely, between the 
ideal and the real, Kantian subject cannot be granted the 
transcendental position of “truly apodictic certainty” as the “ultimate 
ground (letzte Boden) of all scientific objectivity,”38) 
Precisely in this phenomenological thematic-conceptual framework, 
Husserlian meaning of critique comes to consist in ‘being able to 
ground (begründen) in an absolute manner’. The absolute grounding 
of transcendental subjectivity in the sense of “ultimate justification 
(letzte Rechtfertigung)” is to be adequately fulfilled only when 
self-justifying capacity is confirmed on the level of apodictic 
certainty. In this line of thought, the phenomenological notion of 
critique as Besinnung39) finally arrives at Selbstbesinnung as a 
fulfilled form of self-justification. The “reflection on self” signifies 
a constant self-affirmation of the self-sufficiency of one’s own 
transcendental ability for objective meaning formation. The 
reflecting I is to self-evidently affirm and confirm in and through 
the reflection the power of I who is capable of examining oneself 
precisely by virtue of that capacity.40)
The phenomenological notion of epochē, originally signifying a 
38) Husserl(1970a), 114-115.
39) Besinnung, meaning technically a clarification of meaning in the sense of 
a genetic tracing down of its constitution, is co-translated into “sense- 
investigation” in many phenomenological incidences. But, as that 
phenomenological genesis is explicated always in terms of the 
transcendental capacity of ideal subjectivity, Besinnung as the critique of 
rationality has intended a critique of subjectivity from the outset. See 
Husserl(1978), 9. 
40) Husserl(1970a), §15 & FTL, §103.
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“putting out of an action” of any positivistic judgment about 
natural reality41) is reconsidered as a systematic reflective gesture to 
universally question the legitimacy of everything outside the pure 
transcendental realm of self-sufficiency in order to get rid of the 
cognitive fog hazing the primordial clarity of the transcendental 
self-power and hence “lay bare” the ideal subjective origin in full 
intellectual sight.42) It is supposed to conform in the end to an 
infinite act of “waking” to the consciousness of one’s own 
transcendental ability, i.e., an infinite returning to the ideal 
source-place of one’s own power of philosophizing. As such it 
stands for the very critical life of a philosopher. Every 
phenomenological critical gesture now accords to a form of 
returning to the subjective origin in one way or another in the 
sense of getting closer and closer to the ultimate first point of 
justification. The return to the absolute origin-self is to be a telos 
of critique. As such it affirms the “inborn teleology (eingeborene 
Teleologie)” of the European humanity and philosophy.43)
The returning to oneself is to be realized with a practice of 
“theōria” as a teleological maxim from the idea of genuine science. 
The self-reflecting position of the subject is asserted with the 
“striving” for theōria as the ancient Greek philosophical desire to 
behold and bring about the “unconditioned truth” and thereby to be 
the unconditioned truth itself. Infinite activation of that striving is 
nothing but a concrete “vocational” life of a philosopher as a 
genuine scientist, i.e., a life professionally engrossed in such Greek 
theoretical attitude.44) In the end, critique for Husserl is to be a 
41) Husserl(1983), §32.
42) Husserl(1970a), §71.
43) Husserl, “PCE,” in Husserl(1970a), 273.
44) Husserl, “PCE,” in Husserl(1970a), 277-283.
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philosophization as such and the transcendental subject is to be no 
one else than a professional philosopher never ceasing to do the 
work of critique; the absolute transcendental power of subjectivity 
expresses the utmost “legitimatizing authority” that is performed and 
perfected through the critique, and thereby attests the absolute 
institutional bearing of philosophy as a vocational discipline.
4. Schmittian Moments in the Structure of 
Husserlian Critique and Subjectivity
1) Critique as Husserlian Jus Belli 
In Husserl what motivates the phenomenological “universal 
epochē” is the idea of metaphysical purity and genuineness 
(Echtheit). The phenomenological goal is a complete purification of 
the transcendental power of the meaning constituting self, i.e., a 
complete placement of the transcendental subject in the purely ideal 
region ontologically distinguished from the region of real 
objectivity. The infinity being an essentially positive dimension of 
Husserlian critique with the meaning of an infinite affirmation of 
the absolute self-power is also necessarily a negative marking of a 
nonstop de-legitimatization of any attempt to naturalize the absolute 
reference point. In other words, the infinite theōria in Husserl takes 
the form of a constant arguing about and for the due place of the 
ideal transcendental being in more or less Rancièrian sense45) in the 
form of an institutional “disagreement” on the existing validity of 
the real state of affairs at hand. 
In this framework, the Schmittian logic of the political grounded 
on the friend-enemy distinction and jus belli is at work particularly 
45) See footnote 9).
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with the manner in which every otherness is universally examined 
during and by way of the phenomenological critique. Husserlian 
critical drive is drawn out to wage a permanent war against a 
possible threat from all types of irrationalism, skepticism, 
psychologism, naturalism and nihilism, etc., i.e., against any form 
of spiritual-cultural, intellectual resistance to even out the 
metaphysical power-hierarchy between the real and the ideal, 
between the positivistic natural objectivity and the transcendental 
spiritual subjectivity. The Schmittian otherness that had a patent 
existential shape is somehow qualitatively transformed in Husserlian 
system of critique into all kinds and types of the spiritual-cultural 
variants ontologically, axiologically and normatively distinguished 
from the archē of philosophical rationality represented by the 
transcendental ideality; accordingly, rather the threat character 
overwhelms the existential character in the signification of otherness 
in Husserl. Now, to the extent that the distinction of the 
genuineness of the ideal and the nongenuineness of the real as a 
form of otherness should be maintained and the proliferation and 
the running of the resistive cultural moves are taken as a threat, 
the Schmittian battlefield where otherness exists as a potential threat 
plays a theoretical milieu for Husserl, in which the transcendental 
subject should ever be critically awake to “disagree.” 
When the threat character of otherness becomes acute in Husserl, 
critique is concretely shaped into a “struggle (Kampf).” The war 
metaphor of critique in the later Husserl is dominant. Particularly 
through the Crisis text and “The Vienna Lecture,” critique as 
absolute grounding and ultimate justification expresses itself in the 
form of an infinite “spiritual struggle” for universal science, as 
something conceived in the idea of the infinite “striving for 
theōria” already. In a striking resemblance to Marxist historicism, 
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Husserl revaluates the whole history of humanity as the history of 
on-going struggle for an absolute legitimatization of the “universal 
critical attitude” to attain the idea of universal science, which as 
such is represented by the history of European humanity.46) In 
Husserl this historical cultural struggle as an infinite war against 
any philosophically degenerative move coincides with the 
metaphysical theoretical struggle for an absolute residentship of pure 
consciousness and the transcendental self in the place of 
ideal-normative power. The infinite awakening to self-reflectivity as 
a vocational task of philosophy is as such an infinite ‘ultimatum’ 
for a preemptive spiritual war toward the presumable ‘invasions’ 
into that absolute boundary for the ideal being and capacity of self. 
Critique for Husserl is thus a war-like project which calls for a 
“revolution,” courageous confrontation, and uncompromising 
solidarity and leadership, and even a religious missionary “faith” in 
an ‘ethical upgrading’ of the whole humanity with the European 
spirit of universal theōria, the highest form of which is 
phenomenology itself.47) Philosophers as a reification of the ideal 
transcendental subjectivity are messianic “functionaries of mankind”48) 
in readiness to struggle against all modes of nonphilosophical 
speech and existence, precisely as a state and form of otherness 
with which the authenticity of transcendental selfhood is confronted 
as the objects, the legitimacies of which the self refuses to 
acknowledge in total fashion. The war-impetus now engineers and 
runs the whole plot of the phenomenological critique, not as an 
46) Husserl, “PCE”, in Husserl(1970a) , 278-289 & Husserl(1970a), §§ 6-7.
47) Husserl, “PCE”, in Husserl(1970a), 299. See also E. Husserl, “Philosophy 
as Rigorous Science,” in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, 
trans. Quentin Lauer, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965, pp. 71-147.
48) Husserl(1970a), 17.
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auxiliary or accidental cause, but as a kind of Heideggerian 
‘existential’ force, structurally engaged in every theoretical motive 
and move concerning the idea of critique, subjectivity and Europe 
in Husserl. The Schmittian political exposes itself in Husserl qua a 
Heideggerian ‘existential’ quality of the critical phenomenological 
subject who always already understands itself as a spiritual warrior 
and thereby defines and delimits otherness as a totality of all that 
is escaping or confronting or lacking the theoretical, the ideal, the 
rational, the philosophical, the Greco-European, and the 
phenomenological, precisely through and during the critique-war; 
above all, the critical transcendental subject grants itself an 
exclusive right to decide how the other can legitimately be.
2) Crisis as a Threat to Absolute Metaphysical Relation
In Husserl, the concept of crisis works in such a way that the 
contemporary crisis of European culture in general is a 
manifestation of the crisis of the modern European philosophy and 
science, and that this in turn becomes immediately a crisis of the 
European philosophical humanity as an index of the crisis of 
mankind. What is responsible for such essentially globalizing 
cultural crisis is exactly the theoretical crisis of subjectivity in the 
sense of a disorientation of the empirical subject from the 
intentional control of the transcendental subject. 
Now the phenomenological crisis in all these senses means first 
and foremost a relationship crisis, for it brings about the “question 
of the relation between objective-scientific thinking and intuition in 
the life-world prior to theory.”49) “Life-world (Lebenswelt)” is the 
world of originary “prescientific” experience which is soon to be 
49) Husserl (1970a), 134.
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formally determined by a transcendental performance of the 
cognitive reason; it is the world self-evidently pregiven absolutely 
prior to any objectifying act and thereof immediately experiencible 
to the transcendental subject.50) As such, it refers to a totally 
closed-off field of the infinite transcendental capacity to 
intentionally will and form objective meaning. The ‘right’ 
relationship between the prescientific life-world and the objectivity 
of physis is such that the former exists essentially for the latter; 
the objective-real experience in the scientific world is genetically 
affixed to the original prelogical experience in the life-world by the 
work of the transcendental-constitutive “for.” This for-structure 
shows a topology of power-hierarchy which as such represents the 
genetic relation between the two distinct regions of being in the 
transcendental split aforementioned. 
If any meaning claims an in-itself validity outside the horizon of 
the universal critique, refusing the transcendental care, that itself 
blurs the metaphysical regional boundary. It then ipso facto puts 
the self-evident validity of the absolute transcendental subjective 
capacity itself at risk, which is a threat as such. Now that is to be 
a crisis. Just as the mere presence of a nonbeliever does harm 
already to the absolute authority of the creator God, the possibility 
of the being of Out that is not in charge of the transcendental 
grounding, the possibility of registering meaning outside the 
philosophical nomos of critique, eo ipso breaches the rule of truth 
constitution, and thereby is to be an intrinsic existential threat to 
the noetic authority of philosophy to take charge of truth affairs. It 
contests the hierarchical power-relation between the legitimatizing 
authority and the legitimacy given. Therefore the horizon of critique 
50) Husserl (1970a), 123-135.
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must be infinitely expanded so that nothing can elude that 
juridic-hierarchical relational touch. That is what the existential 
logic of philosophy demands from within. What brings about 
critique as a total endless war in the sense of an infinite 
self-alarming is precisely such institutional consciousness of the 
crisis as a potential threat to the absolute metaphysical regional 
boundary between the two ontologically incommensurable beings, 
between the two categorically incommensurable experiences. The 
awareness of crisis precisely as a crisis in terms of the 
metaphysical power-relation is a phenomenological condition for the 
possibility of launching a critique at all.
3) Critique as a Revelation of Exceptional Power, Crisis 
as a State of Emergency 
In Schmitt, exception represents an instant of revelation; only in 
the moment of exception, with the manner in which the exception 
behaves, “it is clear who the sovereign is”51); through the exception, 
the sovereign power becomes visible as well as the politico- 
theological relationship between the one who gives protection and 
the one who must obey in return.52) In Husserl, crisis reveals itself 
as a state of emergency; only in the state of crisis, the absolute 
point-source of meaning-giving power and the phenomenon to be 
judged, i.e., the one that can give legitimacy and the one that 
needs legitimacy are to be revealed precisely through critique as the 
right mode to deal with the crisis. The state of crisis necessitates 
critique during which a decision is made of and on exception. By 
the universal epochē, the illegitimacy of phenomena is decided and 
51) Schmitt (1985), 7.
52) See George Schwab’s Introduction, in Schmitt (1985), lii.
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thereupon the very decisional power itself is revealed as the 
exception as such. What to be unconcealed with the critique is 
precisely that metaphysical power-relation which as such represents 
a political relation. 
To the extent that the obfuscating of the power hierarchy is an 
object of Besinnung, crisis means a loss of epistemic sovereignty of 
philosophy as an institution. The party to whom the crisis is felt as 
a threat is philosophy which went through already an unwanted 
‘dethronement’ by the rising modern natural sciences. Faced with 
the crisis, the internal revolution, i.e., the phenomenological 
movement to ground the essentiality of reason from within, aims at 
a “rehabilitation” of the lost institutional sovereignty of philosophy 
in the field of the administration of truth. While the political and 
social revolution during the Enlightenment was a bottom-up 
revolution through which the governed were rising up to cut the 
head of the Prince or the God, the phenomenological revolution is 
a top-down revolution that the sovereign philosophy plans and 
directs to get its head back. If the Enlightenment critique aimed at 
a total destruction of all kinds of external moral hierarchy as 
irrational before the principle of universality, the phenomenological 
critique speaks up for the internal metaphysical power hierarchy as 
an absolute moral prerequisite for the realization of the 
Enlightenment rationalism in its “genuine sense.”53) 
In this background, the urgent phenomenological task is now to 
inaugurate reason itself into the absolute exception unburdened of 
justification once and for all. It is worked on with the theoretical gesture 
to ontologically fix the exceptional power of the transcendental reason 
in the concept of phenomenological self-evidence (Evidenz) as the 
53) Husserl, “PCE,” in Husserl(1970a), 290-299. 
130 ║ 철학과 현상학 연구
“being-itself-there, originaliter (Selbst-da).”54) Substantially relying on the 
logical positivistic sense of evidence as an ‘ultimatum of givenness’, 
Husserl calls for self-evidence as an ultimately final occasion in the sense 
of a dead end-point other than which there is no more, no further, no 
deeper instant to be reached. Self-evidence is an assurance of 
“self-givenness” as well as an immediate “consciousness” of the 
pregivenness of the life-world and thereby a consciousness of 
self-justifiability as such, i.e., a “self-experience” of the transcendental 
subject of its very power to bring about meaning and distribute 
legitimacy.55) 
This way of conceptualizing self-evidence, serving both the 
phenomenological sense-investigation of logic and the critique of 
subjectivity, has a theoretical objective to cut off any positivistic or 
skeptic challenge to skip or doubt the self-sufficiency of reason. 
Dealing with the institutional-cultural threat by directly appealing to 
the metaphysical force of the concept of self-evidence, Husserlian 
phenomenological strategy reveals itself as a Schmittian political strategy.
4) The Theological Inertia of Causa Sui 
Throughout his career, Husserl frequently describes his 
phenomenological program as a “radical” philosophical movement 
for a renovation of spirit.56) The radicality is claimed to come from 
the point that phenomenological critique undoes the whole tradition 
of metaphysics by totally questioning the positivistic prejudice about 
54) Husserl, “OG,” in Husserl(1970a), 356.
55) Husserl(1978), 283-290 & E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J. 
S. Churchill & K. Ameriks, Evanston:Northwestern University Press, 1973, 
§§5-6.
56) Besides the Crisis text, particularly, the Introduction in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic voices clearly and in length such institutional 
radicalism. But the rhetoric is ubiquitous throughout all his works.
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the in-itself givenness of the world without reference to the deeper 
genetic region of the absolute ideal. Ironically, this so-called 
“phenomenological-transcendental radicalism”57) moors itself firm 
precisely to the idea of Causa Sui, the oldest of the oldest 
metaphysical idea that had premised the whole Western theologico- 
scholastic tradition, having come down even to Spinoza. What 
counts as the phenomenological absolute is, in the end, the same 
ontological essence of Causa Sui as the being of complete 
independence from the force of natural causality, i.e. the being of 
pure immanence that “nulla re indiget ad existendum.”58) 
In the context of Husserl, the meaning of Causa Sui as ‘having 
the cause of its being within itself’ is phenomenologically 
customized into the sense of ‘having the source of legitimacy of its 
being within itself’ to satisfy the intent of self-justification; the 
ontological immanence of Causa Sui is now relegated to the 
immanence of justification so that the absolute can be validated by 
the absolute itself in the place of the absolute. By this tautological 
logic of immanence, the absolute relates to itself and to the other 
than itself, i.e., the nonabsolute as well. 
In the traditional theology, the concept of transcendence used to 
represent the relation of the absolute to the dependent, as the 
relation between the Creator and the created: God, the Creator, 
exists transcendently vis-à-vis the created. In contrast, immanence 
denotes self-relation of the absolute to its own being: the absolute 
needs no other cause than itself for its existence. On this account, 
it is not the existence of God which legitimatizes theological ruling; 
the bare existence of God per se means nothing without the 
existence of the created world which only, can validate the power 
57) Husserl(1970a), 181.
58) Husserl(1983), 110.
132 ║ 철학과 현상학 연구
of the Creator. What ultimately testifies the absolute legitimacy of 
creation is rather the relational order set forth between the Creator 
and the created.
The phenomenological absolute falls under the same dual 
theological relation of transcendence and immanence: it exists 
immanently vis-à-vis itself, while being related to the Nature in 
such manner that the Nature exists transcendently vis-à-vis itself.59) 
The absolute, namely, the pure consciousness and the transcendental 
subject, being the sufficient reason for its own validity, relates to 
every nonself-sufficient reality, qua the sufficient reason for the 
validity of the latter, too; the self-validated absolute relates itself to 
the relative by bestowing legitimacy upon the latter. The 
phenomenological absolute, just like the theological absolute, while 
having to preserve its eidetic-ontologically immanent place as 
exceptional, exists, always already and only, in essential relation to 
the nonself-sufficient other, precisely in the mode of a constant 
speech that ‘you have no other meaning than that you are merely 
my intentional counter-pole’,60) ‘you’ here representing every being 
that is standing as an object over against myself, i.e., the totality 
of otherness. 
Therefore, the urgent phenomenological interest as well as the 
theological one is not simply a securing of the place of the 
absolute per se. Rather what should be absolutely secured is the 
structural relation between the two modes of givenness. Only when 
the power of the exception decides and manages that relation, the 
absolute can appear and be valid as absolute. What is of eidetic 
59) About the phenomenological recapitulation of the concepts of 
transcendence and immanence as two distinct modes of givenness, see 
Husserl(1983), §44.
60) Husserl(1983), §49. Esp. 112.
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necessity is thus this relation of the structural hierarchy. Otherwise 
put, the absolute must live by this relation with otherness. Going 
back to Schmitt, that can explain why the exception never stops 
deciding “who the enemy is.” In the phenomenological context, the 
complete non-relativity of the exception is to be affirmed with the 
decision of ‘who is In and who is Out of the relation’. This is 
how the crisis as a state of emergency signifies a state of relational 
chaos in Husserl. The Schmittian protection-obedience political 
transaction followed by a successful normalization of the emergency 
state is to be ‘transfigured’ in Husserl as a metaphysical 
hegemony-security exchange between the genetic subjectivity and 
the constituted objectivity, between philosophy and positive sciences, 
and between the European philosophizing logos and humanity in 
general. 
It is in this sense that the relational structure of the immanence 
of Husserlian subject represents the structure of the theological 
absolute, but never in the sense that the absolute consciousness 
simply replaces God, which would be rather a Heideggerian- 
Derridean critical point.61) Our point is that the manner in which 
the pure transcendental subject as an absolutely immanental being 
claims self-legitimacy with the notion of self-evidence in Husserl 
replays the theological mechanism of self-justification of Causa Sui, 
whose mode of being is sui generis political in our judgment, more 
or less with Schmittian reference. 
61) For example, Derrida, borrowing Heidegger’s term “onto-theology,” 
directly identifies the ontological quality of phenomenological pure 
consciousness as the source-point of both archē and telos, with “self- 
presence” or “self-perception of presence” of a transcendent being in the 
theological sense. Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David 
B. Allison, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 146-7 & 
the Translator’s Introduction, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii. 
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5. In the Name of the Ethical:
Counter-Schmittian Logic of Inclusive Exclusion in Husserl
Husserlian logic of exception radicalizes Schmittian political logic 
in two respects: first, with respect that it pronounces the principle 
of the most extreme kind of exclusion, namely, self-exclusion on 
which the decision of “who the other is” is derived from the 
decision of “who I am,” second, with respect that it metaphysically 
permanentizes the protection-obedience rule by promising the other 
an eternal ontological security in return of their being an object of 
universal philosophical critique. 
But precisely for the reason that it radicalizes Schmittian logic of 
the political, the Husserlian subject faces an Agambenian paradox 
of the “inclusive exclusion” that is not a proper concern for 
Schmitt. Following Schmittian definition of sovereignty as the 
power of decision on the state of exception, Agamben modifies the 
friend/enemy distinction into the pair of “exclusion/inclusion” based 
on the distinction of “zoē/bios” as the “fundamental category” of 
[Western] politics.62) In doing so, he puts a particular emphasis on 
that the possibility of exception lies in its capacity to announce 
itself as a law.63) The power outside the law holds its legitimacy 
precisely in law, qua law. What makes exception as an exception 
to a rule is the logic of the rule, i.e., jurisdiction as such, on 
account of which exception can maintain still and always a lawful 
relation to exteriority. With this peculiarity, the exceptional right of 
sovereign is not limited to distinguish In from Out, but extended to 
create a new space of legitimacy in which the exception interiorizes 
62) Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford: Standford University. Press, 1998, p. 8.
63) Agamben(1998),15-29.
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what is excluded and therewith to reorder the rule of the whole. 
Exception is thus never a distinction in itself but rather an 
“indistinction” of exteriority from interiority.64) For Agamben, that 
is a “paradox” inherent to the structure of the sovereign exception, 
on which, however, its power completely depends. 
In a great deal, Husserlian rule of regional exception works for 
an Agambenian interiorization of the excluded. In and with critique, 
the totality of everything outside philosophical examination 
permanently regresses backward to the place of pure origin, precisely 
by infinitely progressing toward an ever-more spiritually 
homogenized world guided by the teleology of philosophy and 
Europe. The transcendental critical subject preemptively dismantles 
otherness as a totality of all that is outside the validation from the 
transcendental intentionality and selfhood, by being newly ‘ordered’ 
it in the space of its intentional care. Precisely in this sense and 
way, otherness is always already included inside the closed-off field 
of my intentional will and freedom. 
In Husserl, every objectivity, every otherness actual and possible, 
even humanity as such, is supposed to be ‘reborn’ in the form of a 
‘resignification’ as a result of universal questioning. The goal for a 
clear distinction of the other is not death as an existential killing 
of their body, but birth as a spiritual ‘revitalizing’ of their mind. 
The uttermost goal of critique as a war is to spiritually elevate the 
whole humanity into a universal philosophical species. The telos of 
spiritual “rebirth” of humanity as something built in the idea of 
philosophization now makes philosophy an inherently “ethical” 
vocation simply by the mode in which it exists and comports. The 
permanent state of war as a permanent political state of eliminating 
64) Agamben(1998),19.
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otherness is made over into a permanent state of an “ethical 
edification” of the whole mankind with reference to the 
philosophical theōria. On an explicit level, the ethical comes into 
the fore in this way, instead of the political, in Husserl. A 
spiritually cultivated world with the [European] philosophical spirit 
of theōria is the world where a universal meaning-validation system 
operates: the world in which the ideal normativity and the absolute 
priority of philosophical judgment is universally juridically 
acknowledged.65) 
From Schmittian point of view, however, the world “ethically” 
enlightened to a universal mankind in such Husserlian manner 
represents a completely depoliticized world where neither politics 
nor state is possible due to the pure absence of an enemy.66) For 
Schmitt, like Hobbes, any ethical or economic universalism justified 
on the force of the ideal is what prevents a thinking of humanity 
as such, because the possibility to question what it is to be human 
comes about precisely due to the presence of a conflict which 
involves the possibility of the elimination of actual life.67) 
65) The metaphysical purification of Europe into an idea based on the purely 
ethical teleological responsibility of European philosophical logos is the 
whole agenda of “The Vienna Lecture.” See also Husserl(1970a), §7. On 
the other hand, Reinhart Koselleck’s historical study of the Enlightenment 
crisis-discourse shows how critique works on crisis as an active motif of 
politicization while ‘disguising’ itself in a depoliticized, purely moral 
speech. By and large, Husserl's ethical appropriation of critique and crisis 
can fall in this framework. Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: 
Enlightenment and the Pathologies of Modern Society, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1988.
66) Schmitt (1996), 53-54.
67) Schmitt (1996), 65-68. This position of Schmitt makes Leo Strauss 
interpret him as an extreme kind of moralist. Strauss regards Schmitt’s 
affirmation of the political as the “affirmation of the moral,” thinking that 
he affirms a necessity to be “serious” about humanity by affirming the 
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On the other hand, this world operated upon such Husserlian 
sense of the ethical-teleological urgency of the universal inclusion 
is to be a necessarily politicized world now from Agambenian 
point of view, insofar as it works on the paradox of sovereignty. 
In Husserl, the teleological philosophical moralization permanently 
interferes in the empirical world humanity, while constantly having 
to exclude the ideal quality of the moralizing subject from the very 
empirical regionality. But to show the self-evident legitimacy of 
that disconnection, it should never make the world that the subject 
feels confronting against its authenticity actually disconnected from 
its own world. In the phenomenological logic, the metaphysical 
exclusion of the pure transcendental self-zone can be validated only 
at the moment, in the incidence of a total teleological inclusion of 
all otherness as that which is in the course of transferring from the 
state of illegitimacy to that of legitimacy, for which the very 
self-excluding subjective power is essentially involved. To this 
extent, Husserlian critical subject assures Agamben’s definition of 
the sovereign exception as “what cannot be included in the whole 
of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in 
which it is always already included.”68) 
Nonetheless, for Husserl, the inclusive exclusion works never as 
a paradox as in Agamben, but as an ethical telos first and 
political. [Leo Strauss, Notes on Carl Schmitt,The Concept of the 
Political, trans. J. Harvey Lomax, in Schmitt (1996), 99-122. See 
Paragraph 27]. But I strongly doubt that it is the case with Schmitt to 
whom the ethical is no end of the political. With Schmitt himself, it is 
hard to decide where he stands vis-à-vis moralism in general. The ethical 
itself is simply out of the interest and purpose of Schmitt’s thinking of 
the political. That the political as it is can and should be an independent 
variable to look at the structural mechanism of war and power seems 
rather the clearest Schmittian point. 
68) Agamben(1998), 25.
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foremost. It all and only represents a purely teleological logic of 
critique to essentialize the play of reason for Husserl, whereas for 
Agamben the “inclusive exclusion,” qua the paradox of sovereign 
politics as such, has a negative function and consequence as a 
source of immoral action such as violence and killing of actual 
human bodies, rather than being a moral ground. In this complexity 
out of the involvement of the ethical, the phenomenological logic 
of critique and subjectivity is political neither literally in Schmittian 
sense insofar as what it decides is not an existential extermination 
of a physical entity, nor paradoxically in Agambenian sense for it 
sublimates the paradox itself into a teleological ethical command.
In consideration of all that sort of ‘counter-Schmittian’, ‘unAgambenian’ 
complicatedness and differentiation, we regard the Husserlian logic of 
the teleological with which the European-philosophical spiritual 
habitude is ethically purified on the ground of the idea of genuine 
science and critique, still and precisely, as a political reality for the 
following reasons: in that Husserlian structure, every other cannot but 
be caught in the critical radar of philosophy according to the internal 
cultural-disciplinary demand; the suspended other, whatever its form 
may be, during the universal epochē can never stay outside 
legitimately; even when the other never want to be included and 
never ask for it, simply being outside showing no interest in and 
desire for being reborn in the European philosophical signification, 
the teleologically ethical responsibility internally demanded by the 
idea of philosophy decides that such mode of existence and living is 
not legitimate and such state of affairs is not right; the decision of 
‘who I am’ implements the impossibility for the other to be present 
as a definite other which expresses an original meaning of their own 
outside the reach of my rational power; in the end, the Husserlian 
inclusive exclusion occasions a diastrophism of the whole meaning 
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system itself, i.e., a rearrangement or reconfiguration of the space of 
legitimacy for all beings, in which the normative relation between the 
exclusive mineness and the included otherness is constantly reordered. 
Eventually the decision of how, in what way, the other as a 
teleological object of philosophical critique can and must exist, marks 
up the highest political moment of the purely metaphysical-ethical 
exception. Then, doesn’t the political shine through the ethical in 
Husserl precisely back in the Schmittian sense? 
For Schmitt the ethical is neither a means to nor an end of the 
political, but something that already belongs to the political as a 
structural part of its mechanism. This implies that the decision of 
what the good is itself can be already a political decision. Thus 
one has no reason to interpret the Schmittian view that the political 
is prerequisite in order to talk about humanity as if the political 
itself were an ethical tenet as Leo Strauss does.69) The good is 
merely an interest and an object of ethics as a discipline. A 
relentless appealing to the ethical, as we have seen through 
Husserl’s phenomenology, has nothing to do with anything good as 
such. Rather we need to see through more urgently, first and 
foremost, the structure and mechanism in which the 
phenomenological speech of the ethical subjectivity and critique 
justifies itself and operates its institutional right to speak. Given 
that the interest of the political is not the good as such, but how 
and on what condition, as what  the good itself is decided, the 
phenomenological structure of the speaking of the ethical with a 
presupposition of what the good already is rather verifies the 
mechanism of the political. The Husserlian ethical bespeaks the 
political in each step of its utterance, precisely in regard that 
69) See footnote 67).
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whenever the ethical is said in the phenomenological context of 
idealization, it always already finalizes the good itself; what is to 
be the state that can be legitimatized as good is constantly decided 
with and during the phenomenological purification. 
6. Conclusion
In the move of the phenomenological subject and critique in Husserl, 
the logic of the political comes out in both Schmittian and counter-
Schmittian fashions in a quite intermingled and indistinguishable 
manner as we have seen thus far; while the phenomenological decision 
on the ground of which the exceptional power of the ideal origin and 
the European philosophical spirituality is affirmed and reaffirmed 
follows the Schmittian logic of the political, the phenomenological 
mechanism of critique exhibits once a definite counter-Schmittian 
moment when it mutates the logic of an exclusive politics into the logic 
of an inclusive ethics as the condition for the possibility of thinking 
‘what it is to be human.’ 
In this situation, we now conclude that, in one way or another, 
the Husserlian critical philosophical subject is a politico-theological 
subject who makes a Schmittian decision of who the other is in 
the form of a phenomenological decision of what is a spiritual 
decadence to be exterminated; this political decision is made with 
the operation of the very counter-Schmittian depoliticizing apparatus 
of the ethical. As such it bears out a possibility of a conflict 
caused from an unallowed suspending or an unasked inclusion, 
which can turn to a crisis when it is to be shaped into a concrete 
mode of resistance to philosophical reason. Precisely to that extent, 
the phenomenological critique nourished from the metaphysical- 
theological power of Causa Sui and the teleology of reason 
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manifests itself as a bare political phenomenon, insofar as it never 
breaks out the strict legitimacy-illegitimacy distinction boundary and 
the decision on the exception that has a double denotation as the 
exception of ideal-transcendental subjectivity as the force of critique 
and the exception of the state of emergency as the crisis in the 
relational power-hierarchy. 
One reason that the Schmittian and the counter-Schmittian 
moments are crisscrossed in Husserl is that Schmitt takes body—
whether it is a body of bios or zoē— as a categorical threshold for 
the work of the political, whereas in Husserl the political plays on 
nous. Thus it may well be questionable how much, how directly the 
Schmittian logic of the political is applicable, albeit strategically, 
when the existential threshold moves from body to spirit, if one 
insists that the actual possibility of physical removal itself should 
be the most substantial Schmittian theoretical element. 
Indeed, the flesh of otherness and its physical elimination are 
central Schmittian elements concerning the possibility of the political. 
Thus if our purpose were to statically juxtapose Husserl by Schmitt 
in a mechanical semantic comparison of some of their separate 
concepts and terms dogmatically guided by the Schmittian idea and 
definition of the political and political theology, our whole task itself 
would become an absurdity. Quite distanced from it, our motif was 
rather to look into the political structured in the system of Husserl’s 
phenomenology. For that purpose, we focused on the structural 
mechanism in which the political appears and functions precisely in 
the mode and entanglement of hierarchical power-relation and 
commanding decision. Schmitt was utilized as a strategic instrument 
to envisage the political in such Husserlian particularity. The utility 
of Schmitt can be acknowledged to the extent that it helps to clarify 
the phenomenologically thematized metaphysical power precisely 
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with respect to the political. In that respect, the lens of Schmitt did 
a useful service for us to situate Husserl around the axis of the 
political. 
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<국문초록>
후썰 현상학적 비판과 주체성에 내재한 정치성 관찰: 
슈미트식 규명
이유숙(서울대 철학사상연구소 객원연구원)
“정치적인 것” 또는 “정치적임”(the political)은 칼 슈미트 정치이론에
서 핵심적 역할을 하는 개념이다. 친구와 적을 실존적으로 구분하는 것
을 이 개념논리의 핵심으로 간주하고, 모든 서구 근대 국가정치이론의 
권력개념의 근간을 서구신학에서 찾고 있는 슈미트의 정치신학적 사유는 
많은 논란과 함께 오랫동안 널리 논의되고 다양하게 해석되어 왔다. 한
편, 우리는 자칭 최고형태의 형이상학이자 철학운동의 한 형태인 후썰현
상학 체계 전반을 관통하는 일종의 “구조적 정치성”이 있음을 발견한다. 
특히 후썰식 현상학적 주체와 비판 개념의 형이상학적 이론구조는 “정치
적”이라는 개념으로 표상되고 파악되는 특성을 분명히 보이고 있다. 이러
할 때, 우리는 슈미트식 정치 개념과 논리가 우리가 후썰현상학의 형이
상학적 움직임을 구조적으로 동기적으로 추동하고 있는 것으로 보고 있
는 그 정치성을 드러내게 하는데 유용한 관찰과 분석의 도구적 틀을 제
공할 수 있음을 본다. 이 논문은 후썰이론 전반에 걸쳐 중심적인 이론적 
역할을 담당하는 현상학적 주체—원험(原驗)적 초월자 주체(transcendental
ideal subject) —에 존재론적 ․구조적으로 내재하고 있는 일종의 분명한 
정치적성(politicality)을 가시화하고자 하며, 그 작업에서 슈미트를 어떻게 
전략적으로 유용할 수 있는지 보여주고자 한다.
주제분류: 현상학 비판, 비판이론, 주체성 이론
주제어: 슈미트, 후썰, 정치적임(the political), 초월원험주체, 
보편비판, 구조적특질 
